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FOREWORD
Ethics in Law and Politics
Senator PaulSimon*

I.

INTRODUCTION

I am pleased to introduce Loyola University of Chicago Law
Journal'sspecial symposium issue on Legal Ethics. I may not be the
obvious choice for this honor since I am not a lawyer. I am, however,
the husband of an attorney and the father of another; moreover, I work
everyday with lawyers and have drafted far more legislation than most
attorneys in the profession.
My years in state and federal politics have also provided me with
empathy for the legal profession. After all, politicians and lawyers
share at least one unenviable distinction-they are both roundly
criticized in America today for their ethical shortcomings. The public's
distrust of lawyers and politicians can be traced to a common causeto a perception that both professions have failed to live up to the full
range of their responsibilities, and particularly to a sense that both too
often see their obligations in terms of temporarily pleasing constituents
or clients and not enough in terms of serving the national interest and
the public good. This pervasive attitude is harmful, not only to the
public standing of lawyers and politicians, but-more importantly-to
the well-being and moral strength of the nation itself.
II. PUBLIC TRUST AND POLITICAL ETHICS
For many years, I have warned of the increasing influence of public
opinion polls, focus groups, and political consultants in Washington.
Office-holders have become too quick, when faced with issues of
* Paul Simon was a Democratic member of the United States Senate from the State of
Illinois from 1985 to 1996. He has also served as member of the United States House of
Representatives (1975-1984), Lieutenant Governor of Illinois (1969-1972), member of
the Illinois Senate (1963-1968), and member of the Illinois House of Representatives
(1955-1962). In addition to his extensive years of service in the political arena,
Senator Simon is the author of numerous works, including Lincoln's Preparationfor
Greatness (1965), The Once and Future Democrats (1982), and The Glass House, Politics,
and Morality in the Nation's Capitol (1984).

222

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 28

immense public importance, to stick their finger to the wind to see
which way the public passions are blowing. It is easy to understand
this temptation. As a Senator, I know how appealing it is to do the
popular thing. Most elected officials enjoy their jobs. We are treated
with respect; we are listened to and applauded; and we make decisions
about matters which affect the lives of thousands, if not millions, of
people. Naturally, we dislike casting votes that might jeopardize our
positions. And so political self-interest makes the office-holder
excessively sensitive to his constituents' desires.
Certainly, the desire to please one's constituents is not a bad thing in
and of itself. Public accountability and constituent service are a vital
part of the democratic process. But the legislator's duty is greater than
simply serving his or her constituents' immediate interests. A
representative also has an obligation, as James Madison wrote, to
"refine and enlarge the public views," to use independent judgment,
and to serve the public good.' Edmund Burke declared, in his famous
speech to the electors at Bristol, that "[y]our representative owes you,
not his industry only, but his judgment; and he betrays, instead of
serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion."2
Burke sometimes spoke as if he believed elected officials should
concern themselves solely with the national interest and not at all with
local affairs.3 I certainly would not go that far. Rather, I believe
representatives have two principal obligations-one to their
constituents and one to the broader public good. Fortunately, those
obligations do not generally conflict, and especially in matters of vital
national significance, they are often closely aligned. Nonetheless,
when they diverge, as they inevitably do at times, conscientious
politicians face an ethical dilemma-how to balance the voice of their
constituents with the call of their conscience.

1. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
2. Edmund Burke, Election Speech at Bristol (Nov. 3, 1774), reprinted in BURKE'S
POLITICS 115 (Ross J.S. Hoffman et. al. eds., Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1949).
3. For example, Burke also declared in his election speech at Bristol that:
Parliament is a deliberative assembly of one nation, with one interest, that of
the whole-where, not local purposes, not local prejudices, ought to guide,
but the general good, resulting from the general reason of the whole. You
choose a member, indeed; but when you have chosen him he is not a member
of Bristol, but he is a member of Parliament. If the local constituent should
have an interest or should form a hasty opinion evidently opposite to the real
good of the community, the member for that place ought to be as far as any
other from any endeavor to give it effect.
Id. at 116 (emphasis in original).
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Representatives must resolve this tension as best as they can. It is
reasonable, in my opinion, for representatives to defer to their
constituents' desires when an issue is not clear-cut and the stakes are
not vital. But in fundamental cases where justice is clear, politicians
must have the courage to vote their conscience. The lawmaker must
recognize this simple truth-that some things are more important than
being reelected.
The obligation to exercise independent judgment-rather than to
blindly follow public opinion-is strong in cases affecting citizens
marginalized by society, such as the poor or minorities. These are
people whom the general public is prone to ignore; they are often
powerless to defend themselves in the "court" of public opinion.
Frequently, the legislator's independent sense of justice is all that
protects the underprivileged members of society from neglect or
isolation. If representatives are to be worthy of their positions, they
must have the courage to fight for the least fortunate, even when doing
so is unpopular.
The passage of the new welfare bill is only the most recent and
egregious illustration of Congress' increasing tendency to choose
expediency over principle. To be sure, the political calculus in faivor
of the bill was clear. Welfare has become a dirty word in Am erica
today. Proportionately few welfare recipients vote, and the cases
where welfare is abused are highly publicized. President Clinton
certainly knew which way the political winds were blowing when he
signed the bill.
'But "ending welfare as we know it" is not a noble goal. "Ending
poverty as we know it" is, and the latter goal requires genuine welfare
reform. But that cannot be achieved without jobs for people with
limited skill, without day care for single mothers with small children,
and without job training for those who need it. We are pursuing
"welfare reform on the cheap"-but the next generation will find it
very expensive. Real welfare reform will take an additional initial
investment but, in the long term, will save money, reduce crime, and
make America a more productive society.
The dangerous consequences of the "welfare reform" measure have
been well publicized. According to the Urban Institute's estimates, the
bill will push a million more children into poverty. It will cut food
stamps-basic nutrition for the poor-by nearly 20% from already
low levels.4 This is an unconscionable act, a failure by Congress to
4. DAVID SUPER,
BILL 17-23 (1996).

ET AL., CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, THE NEW WELFARE
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meet its essential obligation to protect those who are neglected by
society.
Candidates who yield to public passions and vote for this kind of
measure may gain some temporary increase in popularity. But in the
long run, citizens perceive the truth. They come to view Washington
as an arena for dividing spoils among powerful factions and interest
groups rather than as a proper forum for deliberating over the common
good. When elected officials follow public opinion at the expense of
justice, they ultimately discredit themselves and their own institutions.
By contrast, candidates who act against public opinion may find
themselves penalized in the polls. But my experience is that over time
the public comes to respect those men and women of principle who
vote their conscience. These politicians gain an unexpected reward: a
deep kind of public respect. I had a small taste of this type of reaction
in 1990, when I was running for reelection to the Senate. Although I
voted against the death penalty and spoke about the need to raise
revenues-two very unpopular positions-I won the election by the
largest margin of any seriously contested campaign for Senator or
Governor. Once, in Chicago, a man approached me and said,
"Senator Simon, I don't think I agree with you on anything. But I
trust you, and I'm going to vote for you." Citizens yearn for candor
and for officials they can trust. If all we can give them is blind
obedience to current polls, we as public officials have failed our public
duties.
Politicians should be distinguished by their willingness to meet the
full ethical obligations of their position-to exercise independent
judgment in matters of justice and to act on that judgment, even when
it leads to unpopular decisions. Walter Lippmann once wrote that a
statesman emerges whenever a politician
stops trying merely to satisfy or obfuscate the momentary
wishes of his constituents, and sets out to make them realize and
assent to those hidden interests of theirs which are permanent..
• . When a statesman is successful in converting his constituents
from a childlike pursuit of what seems interesting to a realistic
view of their interests, he receives a kind of support which the
ordinary glib politician can never hope for .... [O]nce a man
becomes established in the public mind as a person who deals
habitually and successfully with real things, he acquires an
eminence of a wholly different quality from that of even the
most celebrated caterer of the popular favor .... 5

5.

WALTER LIPPMANN, THE ESSENTIAL LIPPMANN 457 (1963).
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Ultimately, the political profession will not redeem itself in the public's
eyes until a larger number of its representatives begin to heed the call
of their conscience over the call of the polls.
III. ETHICS AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION
Unlike the political realm, the legal profession has not always been
viewed with the scorn reserved for it today. In words that may seem
strange to us now, Alexis de Tocqueville wrote that "people in
democratic states do not mistrust the members of the legal profession,
because it is known that they are interested to serve the popular cause;
and the people listen to them without irritation because they do not
attribute to them any sinister designs."6 During the last century,
however, this picture of the legal profession has too often been
replaced by an entirely different one-a picture of lawyers as parasites,
hired-guns of large corporations or grasping clients, motivated by
greed and neglectful of the public good. The legal industry-and it is
an industry-has become increasingly commercialized, with too much
emphasis on profits and the bottom line.
Paralleling this development has been the growth of a new ideology
within the legal culture itself, which one observer has called the
"ideology of adversarial zeal."' It is more prevalent than it should be.
This ideology tells lawyers that they need not concern themselves with
the public good or the ordinary obligations of justice. Rather, their
ethical obligations are simply to serve their clients' desires and
commands.
When unrestrained, this ideology puts few ethical burdens on the
legal profession. Simply stated, it affirms that:
[l]awyers should not commit crimes or help clients to plan
crimes. They should obey only such ethical instructions as are
clearly expressed in rules and ignore vague standards. Finally,
they should not tell outright lies to judges or fabricate evidence.
Otherwise, they may, and if it will serve their clients' interest
must, exploit any gap, ambiguity, technicality, or loophole, any
not-obviously-and-totally-implausible interpretation of the law
or facts.8
6. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 275-76 (Phillips Bradley ed.,
1987) (1835).
7. See David Luban & Michael Millemann, Good Judgment: Ethics Teaching in Dark
Times, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 31, 57 (1995) (stating that "the ideology of adversarial
zeal-the professional religion of a great many lawyers-tells them that they are
morally required to push the edge of the envelope").
8. Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 20 (1988).
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Like the norm of constituent service through polling in the political
realm, the ideology of adversarial zeal panders to the lawyer's own
self-interest. It enables lawyers to ignore the effects of their work on
the rest of society-considerations that may detract from their profits
but should bother their conscience.
To be fair, the ideology of adversarial zeal may have value in some
contexts. For example, in criminal trials, there is a strong temptation
to pre-judge a defendant who stands before the court of law, who
often.is a marginalized member of our society, and who faces the
awesome power of the state's legal machinery. Public norms that
encourage a fervent defense may help to counteract this pressure and
ensure that the defendant has at least one committed defender. That
defender may be all that stands between the innocent individual and the
loss of his or her liberty. 9
The finest legal traditions are followed when attorneys use their zeal
and skills in pro bono work, but today the combination of federally
assisted legal aid and pro bono work still leaves far too many unserved
or under served. In all cases, there is a strong ethical argument for
encouraging lawyers to weigh the broader implications of their work
for society. Just as the politician must balance his constituent's
interests with the public interest, so too must a lawyer balance client
service with public service.
I do not know precisely how that balance should be drawn today in
the legal profession. But it certainly means that lawyers-like
candidates and office-holders-should hold themselves to a higher
standard of conduct than they sometimes do now. It often means that
lawyers should resist the temptation to exploit loopholes in the law and
instead seek to ensure compliance with the spirit of the law. It
certainly means that a lawyer should not engage in a scorched earth
approach to discovery in order to overwhelm a less resourceful
opponent, even if that means sacrificing a strategic edge in litigation.
And it surely means working with the political branches to improve
and strengthen our legal system, even if that effort may temporarily
work to the detriment of existing clients or the attorney's pocketbook.
Self-restraint is essential for a free society to function effectively. We
as a society should set our ethical goals high, given the likelihood that
many will inevitably fall short.
We need, in other words, to revive an old ideology that once
permeated the legal profession, which Dean Kronman of Yale Law
9.

For a broadly similar point about the ethics of criminal defense work, see

LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 62-63 (1988).
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School called the ideology of the "lawyer statesman."' The lawyer
statesman understands that professional obligations extend far beyond
the client's interests to those of the nation at large, and that the Bar's
enormous power in American society comes with a great responsibility
to protect the common good. This is vital, in part, because the legal
profession plays such a basic role in maintaining the nation's ideals.
Professor George Anastaplo has rightly spoken of the Bar's
obligation: "to mediate between popular passions and informed and
principled men, thereby upholding republican government. Unless
there is this mediation, intelligent and responsible government is
unlikely ....The bar is, in short, in a position to train and lead by
precept and example the American people."" Similarly, Justice Louis
Brandeis, who lived the noble ideal of the lawyer statesman in his own
life, spoke of lawyers "holding a position of independence, between
the wealthy and the people, prepared to curb the excesses of either."' 2
Not least of all, a resurgence in the ideal of the lawyer statesman is
important to our nation's future because, in the United States, the legal
profession has traditionally been a training ground for many political
aspirants. We will have little hope of finding statesmen in the political
arena, if we are unable to cultivate statesmen in the legal sphere.
This is an extraordinarily difficult challenge. To change the culture
of the legal and political professions will require a partnership among
law schools, bar leaders, schools of political science, and the public at
large. But before we can begin this task, we need to understand the
reasons an ideology of self-interest has too extensively replaced a
commitment to the public interest in both of our professions. We need
creative suggestions about how to reverse that trend. For this reason, a
symposium issue such as this one is so timely and important to our
national welfare. I congratulate the Loyola University of Chicago Law
Journalfor taking on this fundamental issue.

10. ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 11 (1993) (quoting Chief Justice Rehnquist).

11. In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82, 110 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting) (quoting
Anastaplo's statement to the Bar Committee).
1 2. L. Brandeis, The Opportunity in the Lands in BUSINESS-A PROFESSION 329, 33739 (1933), quoted in Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. Rev.
1, 3 (1988).

